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The  tariff  rate  quota  (TRQ)  system  was  formalised  in  the  Uruguay  Round  with  the  aim  of 
maintaining and improving market access for agricultural products. Under this system, a lower 
tariff rate is applied to imports up to the quota limit, with a higher (and often prohibitive) tariff 
rate levied on products imported beyond this quota. However, the success of the TRQ system has 
been limited, with dairy and meat products in particular still facing relatively high barriers to 
international trade.  
 
In this paper, we examine the impact of the TRQ system on New Zealand’s meat and dairy trade. 
We draw together theoretical and empirical insights and present preliminary findings arising 
from interviews with key stakeholders. In particular, we examine whether the TRQ system has 
achieved its objectives from the perspective of the dairy and meat sectors in New Zealand and we 
analyse problems that appear to exist with the system. We also examine implications of reform of 
the  TRQ  system,  including  lower  in-  and  over-quota  rates,  increased  quota  limits  and  more 
transparent and efficient administration methods.  
 
 
1.  Introduction and Background 
 
Global trade barriers are relatively high for agricultural products, particularly dairy and 
meats.  As  well  as  facing  relatively  high  tariff  rates,  agricultural  trade  is  affected  by 
numerous  tariff-rate  quotas  (TRQs).  Given  New  Zealand‟s  comparative  advantage  in 
agricultural products, factors that impact on these exports are of particular importance. In 
this paper we examine the effects of TRQs on New Zealand‟s meat and dairy trade and 
discuss future reform of the system. 
 
During the Uruguay Round, TRQs were agreed upon to help ensure that market access 
for  agricultural  products  did  not  decrease  during  the  transition  from  an  agricultural 
trading system of complex and relatively high tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to a 
tariff only regime. TRQs were originally designed as a temporary measure (Carbaugh, 
1997). It was feared that without TRQs, a fall in agricultural trade could be the short-term 
result of the Uruguay Round. This could result from „dirty‟ tariffication, whereby NTBs 
are  converted  into  prohibitively  high  tariffs.  Indeed,  very  few  exports  of  agricultural 
products have been made at over-quota tariff rates. These over-quota exports face the 
approximate tariff rates that could have existed for all agricultural exports, had the TRQ 
system not been implemented (Monnich, 2003). With this in mind, and not wanting the 
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Uruguay Round to lead to a decrease in agricultural trade, it was decided that TRQs were 
necessary to maintain the levels of market access prevailing at the time.   
 
It  is  estimated  that  28-30%  of  agricultural  trade  occurs  within  the  TRQ  system 
(Herrmann et al, 2001). The TRQ system was developed with two explicit aims. The first 
was to ensure that market access opportunities would not decline after the commitments 
agreed to in the Uruguay Round were implemented. The second was to develop market 
access opportunities for agricultural products in markets where previously trade barriers 
had essentially prohibited trade. In this sense, the aim of the TRQ system was to open all 
domestic markets to a minimum level of trade. These minimum access requirements were 
set at 5% of the domestic market for developed countries and 3% of the domestic market 
for developing countries, with provisions for these minimum access requirements to rise 
over  time  (Abbott,  2001).  However,  to  these  ends  the  TRQ  system  has  only  been 
moderately  successful.  Quota  fill  rates  average  around  65%  and  problems  of  quota 
administration are numerous and disruptive to the workings of the TRQ system (WTO, 
2002).  
 
The aim of this paper is to examine the influence of the TRQ system on New Zealand‟s 
agricultural trade, with particular emphasis on identifying areas where the TRQ system 
could be improved. There has been very little research specifically analysing the impact 
that the TRQ system has had on the export of NZ agricultural products. With further 
multilateral  liberalisation  of  agricultural  trade  likely  in  the  coming  years,  including 
potential reform of the TRQ system, it is important to more fully understand how the 
TRQ system affects exporters and what negotiated changes are likely to bring the largest 
benefits to the agricultural sector. In this paper, we focus on the dairy and the meat (sheep 
and beef) exporting sectors; these are the most important agricultural exporting sectors 
for NZ and they are the most affected by TRQs.  
 
While time series trade data for NZ dairy and meat products are available, many variables 
influence this data and thus it is difficult to isolate the effects of the TRQ system on 
agricultural trade. For this reason, interviews with key stakeholders were used in an effort 
to improve understanding of the influence of TRQs on agricultural trade and the most 
important areas for future reform. Experts in trade policy were interviewed from many of 
New Zealand‟s significant dairy and meat exporting businesses. In addition, interviews 
were conducted with representatives from industry wide organisations and government 
ministries. Insights gained from these experts are a major strength of this current study, 
however, by its nature this study tends to be qualitative rather than quantitative and there 
will necessarily be elements of subjective judgment in the analysis.  
 
 
2.  The Tariff Rate Quota System 
 
Most of the literature on TRQs focuses on the economic theory and welfare implications 
of this system. For clarity and simplicity in theoretical analysis, we assume the importer 
is  a  small  country  and  that  all  world  supply  curves  are  perfectly  elastic.  While  this 
assumption  may  be  a  reasonable  approximation  for  some  countries,  other  importing   4 
countries may face upward sloping world supply curves. However, this will generally not 
change our broad conclusions.
2 Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical workings of a TRQ. 
 





Figure 1 shows how a TRQ is supposed to operate. Imports are allowed at the In-quota 
tariff rate up to the quota limit. Further imports are charged the higher over-quota tariff 
rate. The domestic market price and quantity traded are determined by the intersection of 
the Ddom and Sw + over-quota tariff curves. One can see that any all goods traded at the 
in-quota tariff rate earn a premium, or quota rent. This quota rent is the difference 
between the market price and the lower price producers would be willing to accept, 
which is determined by the Sw + in-quota tariff curve. The existence of quota rents is one 
important aspect of the TRQ system and they are the result of the need to ration in-quota 
access.  
 
The economic rents associated with TRQs are often large. Quota rents increase as quota 
limits increase, in-quota tariff rates decrease or over-quota tariff rates increase. In a report 
prepared by ACIL for the NZ Business Roundtable in 1992 quota rents were estimated 
for NZ‟s UK butter quota (now the EU butter quota). The size of the quota market was 
then approximately 60,000 tonnes. The estimated quota rents for the years 1989/90 and 
1990/91 were $NZ131 and $NZ118 million (ACIL, 1992). Therefore quota rents can be 
very significant, for this reason, they can have a large impact of how a TRQ operates. 
While these quota rents make importing within the quota level attractive, the distribution 
of rents between exporters and importers depends upon the competitiveness of the market 
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on  both  the  supply  and  demand  sides  (Choi  and  Sumner,  2000).  Simply  put  the 
distribution of quota rents depends upon the market power of exporters and importers to 
set prices. The more market power a firm has the more likely they will be able to capture 
quota rents.  
 
The TRQ system decreases world welfare in comparison to a situation of free trade. This 
is not a surprising result given that it disrupts the workings of markets and can be shown 
to create deadweight loss. However free trade in agriculture is not a realistic possibility in 
the short to medium term. Thus TRQ must be viewed favorably relative to the likely tariff 
only regime that was to be implemented. There are few examples of trade occurring at 
these  over-quota  tariff  rates  and  even  with  the  efficiency  short-comings  of  the  TRQ 
system, it is economically more palatable than its likely replacement (Das, 1998).  
 
Economic theory suggests that a TRQ will operate as a two-tiered tariff, however in 
reality this is often not the case. Abbott (2001) and Skully (1999), among others, describe 
alternate ways in which a TRQ may operate. Their focus is on the level of domestic 
demand. If domestic demand is low, the in-quota tariff rate may prohibit any in-quota 
trade. A TRQ can operate as if it were a tariff only regime, a quota or as a two-tiered 
tariff. A TRQ will operate as a tariff where in-quota trade occurs but not up to the quota 
level. Effectively the quota limit is not restricting trade in this case. A TRQ will operate 
as a quota if the quota limit is achieved but no over-quota trade occurs. In this case the 
over-quota tariff rate is prohibitive. If over-quota trade was to occur a TRQ is said to be 
operating as a two-tiered tariff. This is how the system was intended to operate, although 
high over-quota tariff rates and other factors like quota administration often conspire to 
stop this outcome from being achieved. The high over-quota tariff rates that have been set 
by many countries effectively create quotas instead of two-tiered tariffs. Quotas are a 
barrier to the ability of markets to respond to price signals, allocate resources efficiently 
and respond to changing market conditions (Appleyard and Field, 2001). Skully (1999) 
states that the efficient operation of TRQs has too often broken-down because of the large 
nature  of  over-quota  tariff  rates.  In  very  few  cases  where  over-quota  tariff  rates  are 
applied
3 have over-quota exports actually been made.  
 
In addition to this, tariff rates can have a tangible impact upon the level of trade. The 
higher the in-quota tariff rate the lower the amount of trade that occurs. The in -quota 
tariff rate can prevent trade from taking place if it causes the domestic price in the 
importing country to be lower than the world price plus the in -quota tariff. This is not a 
problem associated with most TRQs as in-quota tariff rates are generally less than 10%. 
However, some in-quota tariff rates are significantly higher than 10%, and particularly in 
times of low domestic demand for imports, they may be significant barrier s to trade 
(Abbott, 2001). In general, experience with the TRQ system has shown that the over -
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2.1  Tariff Rate Quota Fill Rates 
 
One of the primary reasons TRQs were implemented was to make sure trade would occur 
in the most heavily protected domestic markets. Theoretically one could argue that TRQs 
should work best in the most heavily of protected markets as they offer relatively free 
access to markets where domestic producers are relatively inefficient. In the situations 
where TRQs were implemented to ensure that trade didn‟t decrease, one would assume 
that these TRQs would easily be filled as they were established markets where access has 
not  been  diminished.  It  might  be  expected  that  most  TRQs  would  be  filled  to  their 
respective  in-quota  limits.  However  quota  underfill  has  been  perhaps  the  most 
disappointing aspect of the TRQ system (Abbott, 2001).  
 
The most commonly used method of calculating quota fill is the simple fill rate. This 
shows the proportion of the in-quota limit that has been filled by imports for any given 
year. The majority of work done on TRQs uses simple average fill rates, this involves the 
process of averaging quota fill rates across the number of TRQs sampled (WTO, 2002).
4 
In addition to the problem of using simple average fill rates is that fill rates are only 
calculated to 100%. For this reason they are biased downwards in the event of quota 
over-fill,  i.e.  when  over -quota  trade  occurs.  Whi le  simple  averages  do  have  their 
shortcomings, they provide some representation of patterns of quota fill.  
 
In a paper by the secretariat of the WTO simple average fill rate are calculated for the 
years 1995 to 2000. As shown in Table 1, from 1995 to 2000 , between 1/3 and 2/5 of 
potential in-quota trade is not being filled (WTO, 2002). Of particular importance to the 
current research are the fill rates of dairy and meat TRQs, also indicated in Table 1. It can 
be seen that TRQs for dairy products are genera lly filled in the range of 63 -65%. In 
comparison with total average fill rates for all TRQs, dairy fill rates seem to be slightly 
higher than the average while the meat sector does significantly worse than the average. 
TRQs for meat products are generally filled to a lesser extent than for dairy products and 
there may also be evidence of a downward trend in the fill rates of meat TRQs. 
 
Table 1: Tariff Rate Quota Fill Rates for Selected Commodity Groups (%) 
 
  Product Category     
Year  Dairy  Meat  Total 
1995  65  61  66 
1996  63  57  63 
1997  65  55  62 
1998  64  57  63 
1999  63  52  62 
2000  65  54  60 
Source: WTO, 2002. 
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Many reasons have been put forward to explain quota underfill. Deficient demand for 
imports in TRQ markets is commonly blamed. Although this may sometimes be the case, 
it is  unlikely to  explain most or even a good  proportion  of quota underfill  as  TRQs 
account for only a small proportion of the domestic market. This reason is really only 
applicable during economic downturns, when especially good domestic growing seasons 
occur, or in special cases
5 (Abbott, 2001).  
 
Another popular excuse for quota underfill is that in some markets the amount allowed to 
be  traded  under  the  quota  limit  is  too  small  to  be  economic  (Abbott,  2001).
6  
Additionally, exporters like to sell into high value markets where significant returns can 
be made. Quota limits may not be „too small‟ to induce trade just „too small‟ for the 
market they are located in. For example, access to a butter quota into the EU may be of 
much greater value than similar access to a quota in a developing country. Of the 181 
dairy  TRQs  and  247  meat  TRQs  the  majority  give  access  to  developing  or  lesser 
developed countries, or access into small markets (WTO, 2002).
7  
 
While the reasons outlined above no doubt play a role in the issue of quota underfill, the 
issue of quota administration is given the most attention in the literature as the primary 
cause of quota underfill. Quota administration refers to the system of operating a TRQ, 
including the important aspect of rationing quota access (Monnich, 2000). It is thought 
that quota administration is often used in political ways to essentially raise market access 
barriers.  
 
2.2  Administration of TRQs 
 
The theory of comparative advantage implies that free trade would bring benefits to all 
countries,  causing  resources  to  be  drawn  from  less  efficient  industries  into  the  most 
efficient  industries,  and  thus  leading  to  increased  allocative  efficiency.  However  this 
outcome is not politically feasible in the near term. Political considerations implicitly 
force  the  governments  of  many  countries  with  strong  and  large,  although  relatively 
inefficient  agricultural  sectors,  to  oppose  further  liberalisation  of  world  trade  in 
agricultural  products  and  to  make  current  liberalisation  measures  as  ineffective  as 
possible (Corden, 1997).  
 
TRQ administration is fundamentally a rationing problem. There are many ways in which 
to administer TRQs, all have their own costs and benefits but some are better than others. 
TRQ administration is  the means  of rationing the limited amount of in-quota market 
access between competing importers. How these rights are distributed helps to determine 
not only the volume and distribution of trade but also the distribution of quota rents. TRQ 
administration  is  open  to  considerable  political  involvement  meaning  efficient  TRQ 
administration is often unlikely to occur (Monnich, 2003).  
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quantity thus making it uneconomic (MAF Personal communication). 
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Article  XIII  of  GATT  set  two  criteria  for  TRQ  administration  to  ensure  non-
discrimination  in  the  administration  process.  However  these  criteria  are  not  strictly 
enforced. The first of the two criteria was that no additional measures should be imposed 
that  impede  quota  fill. The  second  was  that  the  distribution  of  trade  under the TRQ 
should accurately represent the distribution of trade if the only restriction to trade was a 
tariff. Of the many different administration methods used since the inception of TRQs 
few, if any, accurately adhere to these two principles (www.wto.org).  
 
There  are  many  different  methods  that  quotas  can  be  administered  and  the  WTO 
identifies 10 distinct methods. Some 50% of all TRQs are administered by applied tariff. 
In  actual  fact  this  is  not  a  rationing  method  as  the  in-quota  limit  is  not  binding. 
Effectively an unlimited amount of imports can be imported at the applied tariff rate. The 
other administration methods are of more interest. Of these methods license on demand is 
by far the most frequently used method, accounting for almost 25% of TRQs. First-come 
First served and auction methods are the next most popular. The other methods are used 
less often but are of significant importance as they can often be the most trade distorting 
administration methods and thus likely to be applied in cases where countries are adverse 
to international competition (Monnich, 2003).  
  
There  is  much  theoretical  work  published  on  the  economics  of  specific  TRQ 
administration methods but little empirical research. Generally it is thought that market 
based systems should be the most efficient (applied tariff and auctions). Quasi-market 
systems are thought to be the next most efficient, including license on demand, first-come 
first-served  and  to  a  lesser  extent  historical.  These  methods  are  thought  to  be  less 
efficient  than  market  based  methods  as  they  add  a  random  element  to  the  market 
allocation process and do not necessarily discriminate between efficient and inefficient 
suppliers. This means that less efficient producers have a chance of gaining quota access 
at the expense of the more efficient producers (Skully, 1999). Discretionary methods 
including state trading  and producer  groups are thought  to  be the least  economically 
efficient  of  all  TRQ  administration  methods.  This  is  because  there  are  no  strong 
incentives to fill quotas or to import from the most efficient producers (Skully, 1999).  
 
However TRQ fill rates do not seem to mirror these rankings. State trading and producer 
groups have generally been the administration methods with the highest fill rates.  This is 
especially interesting when we note that licenses on demand and auctioning tend to have 
relatively low fill rates. It would seem that the so called market based methods actually 
do poorly in comparison with the more discretionary methods. The reason for this could 
be that the more valuable a TRQ is, the more likely it is to be filled. If it is more likely to 
be filled, governments can impose discretionary methods of quota administration on it in 
order  to  restrict  quota  fill  and/or  direct  some  of  the  quota  rents  to  domestic  interest 
groups. Studies of TRQ fill rates in Japan and Korea seem to find this result (Choi and 
Sumner,  2000).  Similarly  regression  results  from  Monnich  (2003)  suggest  that  while 
quota administration was important, it did not confirm the common  presumption that 
market based methods are better.  
   9 
In an overall sense, TRQ administration can be a barrier to quota fill as it often increases 
the costs of importing into a TRQ market (Skully, 1999). Moreover TRQ administration 
may also lead to the actual benefits of importing into a TRQ being much less than the 
potential benefit of doing so. This occurs when TRQ administration results in a change in 
the  distribution  of  quota  rents  away  from  the  exporting  companies  and  towards  the 
importing country (Abbott, 2001). Auctions, state trading and producer group methods of 
administration result in this outcome. Thus TRQ administration can be used as a NTB. 
 
In  addition  to  the  administration  methods  outlined  above,  country  specific  tariff  rate 
quotas (CSTRQs) are of significant importance in the trade of agricultural products. A 
CSTRQ represents specific market access for an individual country. This market access is 
given on an individual basis. Generally the responsibility for the administration of these 
CSTRQs  is  given  to  the  exporting  country,  where  they  may  choose  an  appropriate 
method of administration (Skully, 1999).  
 
In New Zealand, the integration of the NZ Dairy Board into Fonterra saw the rights to 
NZ‟s CSTRQs transferred to Fonterra. This left Fonterra as exclusive holders of many 
CSTRQs, allowing relatively free access for specified quantities of dairy products into 
designated markets.  In the next  5-10  years Fonterra‟s exclusive quota  access  will be 
removed  and  a  new  administration  system  will  be  put  in  place  which  all  NZ  dairy 
producers will have access to. The specifics of the new system are yet to be finalised. 
Meat NZ administers all four of NZ‟s meat CSTRQs which give NZ exporters access to 
the US and EU markets.  
 
 
3.  Findings for New Zealand 
 
Evidence gathered during interviews with NZ firms and organisations involved with the 
TRQ  system  suggest  it  has  met  its  objectives  of  maintaining  and  developing  market 
access opportunities for agricultural products. Specifically the TRQ system has allowed 
NZ exporters to further develop valuable market access in the US beef market, the EU 
sheep meat market and the EU butter market.  For example the EU butter quota was 
significantly increased upon conclusion of the Uruguay Round. Supporting this finding is 
retrospective  research  which  suggested  that  agricultural  trade  in  these  products  is 
significantly greater because of the Uruguay Round agreement (MAF, 2001). Most of 
these gains have been attributed to expanded quota limits, especially with regard to NZ‟s 
CSTRQs. The conclusion that the TRQ system  has generally met its objectives from 
NZ‟s point of view is further confirmed when NZ‟s dairy and meat trade statistics are 
examined. As shown in Figure 2, there is a general upward trend in the value of NZ dairy 
and meat exports. The „dip‟ in exports in the late 1990‟s can be attributed to the Asian 
Economic Crisis and its flow-on effects. There is no noticeable adverse impact of the 
Uruguay Round on either dairy or meat exports. Overall NZ exporters believe that market 
access opportunities were generated by the Uruguay Round. However, these gains in 
some cases have not been as large as expected. For example NZ is still effectively shut-
out of Japan‟s beef market. 
   10 
 
Figure 2: New Zealand’s Dairy and Meat Exports by Value 
 
 
Source: PC Infos 
   
 
3.1 Main Elements of the TRQ System  
 
There are four main elements to a TRQ. These are the quota limit, both the in-quota and 
over-quota  tariff  rate,  and  the  quota  administration  method.  Each  of  these  elements 
impacts on NZ dairy and meat exporters.  
 
NZ exporters tend to view quota limits as too low in high value markets. With regard to 
CSTRQs the only reason for underfill seems to things outside the control of exporters (for 
example, not being able gain an export certificate in a timely manner). Quota limits for 
CSTRQs appear unlikely to rise and there is a view that NZ should all it can to secure the 
future of these quotas because of the valuable quota rents that come with them. 
 
In general NZ exporters do not appear particularly concerned about in-quota tariff rates. 
Some exporters would even be willing to incur a higher in-quota tariff in exchange for 
greater in-quota market access.  
 
Over-quota  tariff  rates  faced  by  both  dairy  and  meat  exporters  are  almost  invariably 
prohibitive.
8  However, industry representatives stress the importance of getting ove r-
quota rates bound at their applied level (usually the in -quota rate) to secure market 
                                                 
8 Though apparently there are some exports of cheese to the US at an over-quota rate of 40% (Fonterra, 
Personal communication). 
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access. The danger is the risk and uncertainty associated with the possibility of some 
countries  will  begin  to  apply  their  respective  over-quota  rates  when  exports  rise 




NZ dairy and meat exporters tended to view quota administration as a serious problem of 
the  TRQ  system,  with  exporters  finding  the  TRQ  system  very  complex.  Quo ta 
administration appears to be used by some countries as a NTB and the complexity of the 
system can be a significant barrier to filling TRQs.   
 
TRQ reform could alter each of these four elements. Reform would see larger quota 
limits,  lower  in -quota  or  ov er-quota  tariffs,  more  transparent  and  efficient  quota 
administration, or a combination of these things. The general opinion of stakeholders 
appears to be that additional market access for NZ products is of most importance, thus 
larger quota limits would b e most beneficial. However larger quotas limits may just 
create  bigger  incentives  for  importing  countries  to  use  more  inefficient  quota 
administration methods, create additional conditions or apply over -quota tariff rates 
which are presently not always applied. For these reasons it appears that all elements of 
the TRQ system should be reformed together. The key element of these „rules‟ is to 
provide increased certainty to exporters.  
 
3.2  Country Specific Tariff Rate Quotas 
 
The current research has highlighted the significance of CSTRQs for New Zealand. The 
majority of NZ dairy and meat exports that go into TRQ markets go through CSTRQs not 
MFN quotas. This is disturbing, because unlike MFN quotas, CSTRQs are able to be 
changed  or  even  taken  away  by  importing  countries.  CSTRQs  also  go  against  the 
fundamental principle of the WTO which is non-discrimination. Overall, dairy and meat 
producers appeared to favour expansion of CSTRQs, however, they note that this is not 
likely to be possible. Aside from CSTRQs, license on demand tended to be the most 
popular  system.  An  auction  system  appears  to  be  unacceptable  to  producers  as  it 
effectively nullifies most of the gains from quota access. 
 
In the export of NZ sheep and beef more than 50% of total exports go into CSTRQs in 
the US and the EU (Meat NZ, Personal Communication). Thus, like the dairy industry the 
meat industry is vulnerable to any change in the trade policy of the US or the EU with 
regard to CSTRQs. While the transfer of CSTRQs into MFN quotas in a theoretical sense 
will not decrease market access, the impact on NZ could be adverse, as it would have to 
compete with other countries for market access under the quota.  
 
                                                 
9  For  example,  trade  in  casein  to  the  US  was  relatively  free  since  the  US  does  not  produce  casein. 
However, with casein trade to the US increasing, US dairy farmers are claiming that it is impacting on the 
demand for their products and a TRQ may be implemented, causing a significant loss in market access for 
NZ (Fonterra Personal communication).   12 
3.3 Risk and Uncertainty within Quota Administration 
 
Firms need „good‟ information with which to make strategic decisions, and firms are 
unlikely to invest when the risk and uncertainty is substantial. With regard to the TRQ 
system the feeling seems to be that most methods of quota administration do not give 
enough  certainty,  in  terms  of  market  access,  to  make  long-run  strategic  decisions. 
Economic theory, as noted above, suggests that market based administration methods will 
be  the  most  efficient,  thus  having  the  highest  fill  rates.  However,  market  based 
administration methods, like license on demand or auctions have generally had relatively 
low fill rates. To put it simply, these methods do give certainty of market access but not 
to individual firms. Because of this, firms, most likely being risk adverse, seem to invest 
a suboptimal amount into developing TRQ market access, resulting in TRQ underfill.  
 
Of course not all quota administration methods fail to give firms adequate „certainty‟. 
The way that CSTRQs are administered in both the dairy and meat industries within NZ 
gives firms a large degree of certainty as to how much they will be able to export. This 
reduces the risk associated with „losing‟ market access to almost nothing, thus inducing 
the required amount of investment and production to fill these CSTRQs. Essentially for 
the TRQ system  to  be  effective it must give sufficient incentives  to  exporters to  fill 
quotas and make appropriate investment decisions.  
 
One interesting aspect to come out of the current research is the importance of specific 
assets in successfully dealing with the  TRQ system. Specific assets appear important 
because of the extremely complex nature of the TRQ system. The specific assets that are 
of  value  include  knowledge  of  the  TRQ  system,  experience  with  the  TRQ  system, 
international reputation, international infrastructure (customer relationships, marketing) 
and the quality and quantity resources available (including money, human resources and 
time).  Large  exporters  can  do  disproportionately  well  from  the  present  TRQ  system 
because they have these specific assets in abundance. While there may be benefits from 
simplifying the TRQ system, it may not be in their best interests for this to occur. The 
importance of „specific assets‟ means that the TRQ system may be biased towards larger 
exporters. This may impose significant barriers to the continued expansion of smaller 
dairy and meat producers especially if other market access beyond the TRQ system is 
unavailable.  
 
If the TRQ system were to be significantly simplified it may be that smaller exporting 
firms would stand to gain the most. From a NZ perspective the complicated nature of 
TRQ administration may be favourable to the extent that most dairy exports are made by 
one  organisation  very  experienced  in  the  intricacies  of  TRQs.  A  further  interesting 
finding of this research is that NZ firms may not be fully exploiting the market access 
opportunities of the TRQ system because there exists a lack of information. While large 
firms, government ministries and industry associations tend to be well informed on the 
TRQ system, the same cannot be said for smaller producers. 
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3.4  High Value-added Exports 
 
In  general  it  is  thought  that  one  of  the  important  ways  in  which  NZ  could  increase 
economic  growth  is  by  exporting  products  with  a  higher  value-added  content.  In 
agriculture  this  would  mean  a  shift  away  from  the  export  of  commodity  products. 
However, one of the main barriers to doing this is finding markets for these value-added 
products  and  the  TRQ  system  appears  biased  in  favour  of  the  export  of  commodity 
products. It can be difficult to develop markets for these higher „value-added‟ products 
because  of  the  restrictive  nature  of  product  definitions  in  TRQ  agreements.  The 
introduction of spreadable butter into the UK is a good example of this. While it occurred 
before the time of the TRQ system it clearly demonstrates the problems exporters face 
with the TRQ system today. The main problem was that the UK‟s definition of what 
constituted butter was so tight and inflexible that spreadable butter was deemed not to be 
butter by the UK. Consequently NZ exporters faced, and eventually won, a costly legal 
dispute with the UK that eventually allowed them to export this product. Although they 
won this right, by the time they could export to the UK, EU producers had already copied 
their  product.  Interestingly,  this  UK  butter  quota  eventually  became  NZ‟s  EU  butter 
quota but the condition still remained that any butter imported into the EU had to contain 
salt. Although NZ now could supply any market within the EU, UK consumers were the 
only ones who ate salted butter ( Fonterra, personal communication). 
 
3.5  Benefits of Further Agricultural Trade Liberalisation  
 
As it stands TRQs while offering some market access, significantly constrain the ability 
of New Zealand exporters to supply some markets. But they do allow significant quota 
rents to be earned as prices are kept artificially high. Further liberalisation of agricultural 
trade should lead to greater market access opportunities for NZ exports. However this 
will come at a price which may be the loss of quota rents as domestic market prices in 
importing  countries  fall.
10  While we may assume that free trade (or freer trade) in 
agriculture will be of benefit to NZ this may not necessarily always be the case. 
 
The consensus from participants in t his survey seems to be that in the export of dairy 
products liberalisation will almost certainly lead to net benefits for NZ. Currently many 
of  NZ  dairy  exports  go  into  low  value  markets  like  Latin  America  and  further 
liberalisation will allow NZ to substitute higher value markets like the EU, US and Japan. 
While it is accepted that some quota rents will disappear, increased market access into 
high value markets will likely more than compensate for these losses. Furthermore only 
7% of New Zealand dairy exports presently go into quota markets, meaning only 7% of 
dairy exports currently earns quota rents (Fonterra, Personal communication). 
 
It is less certain how liberalisation will affect meat exports. Well over 50% of both beef 
and lamb exports currently enter into quota markets thus the meat sector stands to lose 
significant quota rents from trade liberalisation. These quota markets also include the 
                                                 
10 Prices will fall as the further liberalisation of the TRQ system will allow a larger supply of imported 
products, making them less scarce. Lower prices mean that the difference between in-quota prices and 
market prices is less, thus potential quota rents per unit of exports are lower.   14 
high value markets of the EU and the US. Much will depend on the meat sectors ability to 
significantly increase production so that it can export more. But a question remains over 
how much more meat (and dairy products) NZ can produce.  
 
Issues such as irrigation constraints and RMA were tabled as potential barriers to growth 
in farm production. The irrigation issue has recently come to a head in South Canterbury 
where all new dairy developments have been put on hold because of a lack of water 
(NZPA 2004a and 2004b). A further constraint to producing more agricultural products 
may  be  a  lack  of  suitable  land.  While  it  is  true  that  there  is  some  land  that  can  be 
converted to agricultural production, in the most part suitable land is already being used 
in the production of dairy and meat products. Even if there were a lot of „spare‟ land with 
which NZ could increase meat production there is likely to be competition for this land 
from the dairy sector. For this reason NZ must increase production through productivity 
gains and more intensive farming practices.  
 
 
4.  Conclusions and Areas for Future Research 
 
Generally the TRQ system is viewed as „a step in the right direction‟ for multilateral 
agricultural trade policy. In saying this, many problems or frustrations that still exist in 
the  TRQ  system.  Although  the  NZ  dairy  and  meat  sectors  tend  to  support  the 
continuation of the TRQ system, the timely reform of it is seen as essential. There are 
measures we can put in place to better make use of the current TRQ system and secondly 
there are reforms that can be argued for at the present Doha round of multilateral trade 
negotiations and in future multilateral trade negotiations.  
 
To better exploiting the current TRQ system, it is possible that improved information 
could assist exporters. For example, a database could be prepared with relevant data on 
each  quota  including  the  quota  size,  in-quota  and  over-quota  tariff  rates,  the 
administration method, historical fill rates and additional conditions that exporters must 
meet.  This  database  could  be  available  to  all  NZ  dairy  and  meat  producers,  with 
additional help available to firms wanting to develop a TRQ market. This may assist 
smaller  producers  to  deal  with  their  lack  of  specific  assets  by  lowering  the  costs  of 
searching for TRQ information and potential market access opportunities. In an economic 
sense this database would decrease the transaction costs associated with developing new 
markets by making information more readily available, thus allowing exporters to make 
better informed decisions. 
 
All four key aspects of TRQs could usefully be liberalised, i.e. lower in-quota and over-
quota  tariffs,  larger  quota  limits  and  more  transparent  and  efficient  administration 
methods. It seems important that a system of rules on quota administration are formed so 
to diminish the possibility of inefficient administration methods being implemented for 
political reasons. Furthermore more emphasis should be placed on giving certainty of 
market access to producers. Also, from NZ‟s point of view the TRQ system should not 
discriminate against value-added products, and implicitly against some of the smaller 
dairy producers. For this to become a reality, the definition of products within TRQs may   15 
need to become more liberal, for example, general cheese quotas rather than quotas for 
specific cheese types.  
 
NZ heavily relies on CSTRQs. Already NZ faces the prospect of losing its EU butter 
quota (Fonterra, Personal communication). Emphasis should be placed on securing the 
continuance of our remaining CSTRQs, or significant market access opportunities that 
presently exist may be lost. While there appear  to be many ways in which the TRQ 
system  could  be  reformed  to  improve  its  efficiency,  an  interesting  argument  can  be 
developed from the success of CSTRQs in New Zealand. The aim of the TRQ system is 
to foster agricultural trade and to do this higher quota fill rates are obliviously better than 
lower quota fill rates. NZ‟s experience suggests that well administered CSTRQs can be 
very effective with quota fill rates consistently at near 100%. The reason for the success 
of CSTRQs in NZ seems to be the certainty of market access they give individual firms. 
In  Coase‟s  discourse  this  would  suggest  that  property  rights  have  been  explicitly 
allocated and because of this an efficient outcome has resulted. If the maximisation of fill 
rates was the primary goal of the TRQ system, a Coasian argument would suggest that fill 
rates will be maximised when property rights to TRQ access are clearly allocated and any 
TRQ access can be exchanged in the marketplace (transaction costs are low). This would 
suggest that market access within the TRQ system should be allocated in a way that gives 
individual firms certainty. CSTRQs allow this to occur, for example Meat NZ administers 
NZ‟s  CSTRQs  in  a  way  which  gives  meat  producers  guaranteed  market  access.  In 
addition to this CSTRQs should be tradable at either the country or firm level. This would 
allow the market access opportunities to move to the countries and firms which value 
them the greatest, i.e. those with the greatest comparative advantage in the production of 
a given product. However there are some practical problems with this suggestion, not 
least of which are the transaction costs involved. 
 
The analysis in the current paper has tended to be qualitative. To better understand the 
implications of TRQ reform, quantification will be needed.
11  However, most current 
international trade modelling does not adequately capture TRQs and cannot quantify the 
implications of changes to the TRQ system. Modelling TRQs within a global trade model 
such as the well-known Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model is now possible 
(Elbehri and Pearson 2000), though far from straightforward. There are considerable data 
problems, including the aggregation of very detailed level TRQs across both products and 
regions.  Further  work  in  modelling  and  quantification  of  the  effects  of  TRQs  may 
contribute to a much improved understanding of the impact of agricultural trade reform, 
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